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General philosophy of science

Vetting Theoretical Virtues: Parsimony and the Framing Effect

Samantha Wakil, James Justus, Nick Byrd*

Abstract

Are simpler explanations always better? Some experiments find that people prefer simple explanations to more probable explanations. However, it remains unclear whether other explanatory virtues (e.g., unity) have the same appeal or whether such explanatory biases apply to less contrived, real-world explanations. In three experiments we investigate these questions. We replicated an implicit simplicity bias and moderated it by explicitly describing certain explanations as “the simplest” (Study 1). Then we found that other superlatives (“most unifying” and “most complex”) lacked the same explanatory appeal (Study 2). Finally, we detected this simplicity framing effect for scientific explanations, but only among students (vs. crowd workers)—and we did not detect simplicit framing effects for political or everyday explanations. These data suggest that simplicity is more appealing than other common explanatory virtues, but its appeal may be limited to certain domains and populations.