I propose that some scientific models and modeling claims are fruitfully diagnosed as a particular kind of political speech act; namely, as dogwhistles. Dogwhistles, broadly speaking, are speech acts which send different, conflicting, and often differentially inflammatory messages to their listeners. I argue that dogwhistling can arise in the context of scientific modeling in at least two ways. First, models may be dogwhistles when their targets are characterized in ways that allow differentially inflammatory interpretations among listeners, which I call representational dogwhistling. Second, claims about the adequacy of particular models for certain purposes may be dogwhistles when these purposes are characterized in ways that allow for conflicting interpretation, which I call fit-for-purpose dogwhistling. Importantly, both representational and fit-for-purpose dogwhistling can occur independently of any ill intentions of either speakers or listeners. 

This diagnosis has important consequences for our understanding of both dogwhistling and scientific communication. Because dogwhistling may effectively insulate a speaker from certain kinds of criticism, it may threaten the epistemic as well as the moral goods of science. Furthermore, I argue that the possibility of models as dogwhistles has important consequences for philosophers of language: it shows that, although many analyses have focused on intentional dogwhistles, unintentional dogwhistling is possible, important, and perhaps rampant. Finally, it illustrates a novel temporal dimension of dogwhistling in scientific practice, which can productively inform our understanding of dogwhistling in general.